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Abstract
The 2007 subprime crisis has induced a persistent disconnection between the Libor
derivative markets of different tenors and the OIS market. Commonly proposed ex-
planations for the corresponding spreads are a combination of credit risk and liquidity
risk. However in the literature the meaning of liquidity is either not precisely stated,
or it is simply defined as a residual spread after removal of a credit component. In
this paper we propose a stylized equilibrium model in which a Libor-OIS spread (LOIS)
emerges as a consequence of a credit component determined by the skew of the CDS
curve of a representative Libor panelist (playing the role of the “borrower” in an in-
terbank loan) and a liquidity component corresponding to a volatility of the spread
between the refinancing (or funding) rate of a representative Libor panelist (playing the
role of the “lender”) and the overnight interbank rate. The credit component is thus
in fact a credit skew component, whilst the relevant notion of liquidity appears as the
optionality, valued by the aforementioned volatility, of dynamically adjusting through
time the amount of a rolling overnight loan, as opposed to lending a fixed amount up
to the tenor horizon on Libor. “At-the-money” when the funding rate of the lender and
the overnight interbank rate match on average, this results, under diffusive features, in
a square root term structure of the LOIS, with a square root coefficient given by the
above-mentioned volatility. Empirical observations reveal a square root term structure
of the LOIS consistent with this theoretical analysis, with, on the EUR market studied
in this paper on the period half-2007 half-2012, LOIS explained in a balanced way by
credit and liquidity until the beginning of 2009 and dominantly explained by liquidity
since then.
Keywords: Libor, OIS, Funding, Credit, Liquidity.
∗The research of S. Cre´pey benefited from the support of the ‘Chaire Risque de cre´dit’ and the ‘Chaire
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21 Introduction
The main reference rate for a variety of fixed income derivatives is the Libor in the USD
market and the Euribor in the EUR market. Libor (resp. Euribor) is computed daily as an
average of the rates at which a designated panel of banks believe they (resp. a prime bank)
can obtain unsecured funding, for periods of length up to one year. From now on we shall use
the term Libor and the letter L to denote any of these two rates. Following the recent credit
crunch, which severely impacted trust between financial institutions, overnight interest rate
swaps (OIS) became more and more popular. In these financial instruments, the floating
rate is obtained by compounding an overnight interbank rate (O/N) rt, i.e. a rate at which
overnight unsecured loans can be obtained in the interbank market (the Federal Funds rate
in the USD fixed income market and the EONIA rate in the EUR market). As a result, an
OIS rate R 1 can be interpreted as a suitable average of r (we denote by a single letter r
the whole random process rt(ω), as will be used further down with “n”, “α”, “β” and “c”).
In theory, arbitrage relations imply that L = R. However, the interbank loan market
has been severely impacted since the 2007 subprime crisis and the ensuing liquidity squeeze.
The reference interbank rate remains the Libor, though, which still underlies most vanilla
interest-rate derivatives like Swaps, FRA, IRS, cap/floor and swaptions. The resulting
situation where an underlying to financial derivatives has become in a sense arbitrarily
fixed by a panel of key players in the derivatives market poses insider issues, as illustrated
by the recent mock Libor affairs (Wheatley 2012). But first of all, it poses a crucial funding
issue as, on the one hand, in parallel to the drying up of the interbank loan market, Libor
got disconnected from OIS rates (see Fig. 1); whilst on the other hand, as more and more
trades are collateralized, their effective funding rate is the corresponding collateral rate,
which is typically indexed to the O/N rt. This creates a situation where the price of an
interest-rate product, even the simplest flow instrument like a FRA, involves (at least) two
curves, a Libor fixing curve and an OIS discount curve, as well as the related convexity
adjustment, which in the case of optional products can be significant (cf. (Mercurio 2010)).
Via the relations between counterparty risk and funding this also has some important CVA
implications; see (Cre´pey 2012a; Cre´pey 2012b; Pallavicini, Perini, and Brigo 2011).
Commonly advanced explanations for the Libor-OIS spreads (L−R), often called LOIS
in the market, are a combination of credit risk and/or liquidity risk.See (Bean 2007; Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen 2009; Smith 2010; Cre´pey, Grbac, and Nguyen 2012; Eisenschimdt
and Tapking 2009; Filipovic´ and Trolle 2011; Morini 2009). Nevertheless, in these expla-
nations the meaning of liquidity is either not precisely stated, or it is simply defined as a
residue after removal of a credit component. In this paper we propose a stylized equilib-
rium model to evaluate at which rate does a bank find it interesting to lend at a given tenor
horizon, as opposed to rolling an overnight loan which it can cancel at any moment. In this
setup LOIS emerges as a consequence of the skew (as measured by λt below) of the credit
curve of a representative Libor panelist (playing the role of the borrower in an interbank
loan), and of the volatility of the spread ct = αt − rt between the refinancing rate αt of a
representative Libor panelist (playing the role of the lender) and the O/N rt.
We illustrate our study using 07/07/2005 to 16/04/2012 EUR market Euribor/Eonia-
swap Bloomberg data, covering both out-of-crisis and in-crisis data (2007-09 credit crisis
and ongoing Eurozone sovereign debt crisis). Note that the EUR market is even larger than
the USD market; moreover, the Euribor and Eonia bank panels are the same, whereas the
1See e.g. the formula (62) in Subsection 4.3 of (Cre´pey, Grbac, and Nguyen 2012) for an exact definition
of an “OIS rate”.
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3Figure 1: Divergence Euribor (“L”) / EONIA-swap (“R”) rates. Left : Sudden divergence
between the 3m Euribor and the 3m EONIA-swap rate that occurred on Aug 6 2007; Right :
Term structure of Euribor vs EONIA-swap rates, 16 April 2012.
FF rate panel is larger than the USD Libor one. On related topics (Filipovic´ and Trolle
2011) conducted empirical studies on both EUR and USD markets and obtained very similar
results in both cases.
2 Equilibrium Model
We assume that the funding rate (or refinancing rate, funding rate, cost-of-capital, cost-
of-liquidity...) of a lending bank with a short term debt D (“immediately callable debt”
like short term certificate deposits, say more broadly ≤ 1y-liabilities) is given by a ran-
dom function ρt(D). In particular, denoting by Dt the time-t short term debt of the bank,
αt = ρt(Dt) is the annualized interest rate charged to the bank on the last euro that she
borrowed for funding her loan (current refinancing or funding rate of the bank). Note that
this time-t funding rate αt is a complex output possibly impacted by, depending on the
treasury management of the bank, beyond the level of the time-t short term debt Dt of the
bank (as compared to its immediately repositable capital Ct), various factors including the
O/N rt, the bank’s CDS spread as well as other macro-economic global variables. More
broadly, ρt(Dt + x) is the annualized interest rate charged to the bank on the last euro of
a total of e(Dt + x) borrowed by the bank for funding her loan. Here the variable x rep-
resents the putative extra amount of capital borrowed by the bank to refund a loan (rolled
overnight or on the Libor market). For liquidity reasons, ρt(D) is increasing in the debt D
(or ρt(Dt + x) is increasing in x; see (4) for a linear specification), so that “the next euro
borrowed costs more than the previous one”. Since the marginal cost ρt(Dt + x) needs to
be integrated over x from 0 to N in order to give the global refinancing cost for the bank
of lending a given global amount N , therefore this global refinancing cost is convex in N
(as the integral of a convex function). This convexity reflects the optionality feature of the
funding liquidity issue.
We denote by P and E the actuarial probability measure and the related expectation.
Let nt represent the amount of notional that the bank is willing to lend at the O/N rate
rt between t and t + dt. The problem of the bank lending overnight is modeled as: maxi-
mizing over the whole stochastic process n the expected profit of the bank, which we put
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4in mathematical form as
U(r;n) = 1
T
E
(∫ T
0
ntrtdt−
∫ T
0
∫ nt
0
ρt(Dt + x)dxdt
)
←− max n (1)
By contrast to this situation, when lending at Libor over a whole period of length
T , a bank cannot modify a notional amount N which is locked between 0 and T . As the
composition of the Libor panel is updated at regular time intervals, there is, during the life
of a Libor loan, increasing credit risk as compared with an overnight loan rolled over the
same period. Indeed, as time goes on, the refreshment mechanism of the panel guarantees
a sustained credit quality of the names underlying the rolling overnight loan, whereas the
LIBOR loan is contracted once for all with the initial panelists; see (Filipovic´ and Trolle
2011) for a detailed analysis, and see further developments following (6) below. Accordingly,
let a stylized default time τ of the borrower reflect the deterioration of the average credit
quality of the Libor contributors during the length of the tenor. This deterioration only
affects the lender when lending at Libor, in other words, the stylized default time τ only
corresponds to those default events that could have been avoided, had the loan be made as
rolling overnight. It represents the “survivorship bias” that overnight loans benefit from.
Let a constant N represents the amount of notional that the bank is willing to lend at Libor
rate L over the period [0, T ]. The related optimization problem of the bank can then be
modeled as: maximizing with respect to the constant amount N the expected profit of the
bank, which we put in mathematical form as
V(L;N) = 1
T
E
(
NL(T ∧ τ)−
∫ T∧τ
0
∫ N
0
ρ(Dt + x)dxdt− 1τ<TN
)
←− max N (2)
As we are dealing with short-term debt, we assume no recovery in case of default.
We stress that r and n represent stochastic processes in (1) whereas L and N are
constants in (2). The utility functions of the bank which are implicit in (1)-(2) are taken in
a standard economic equilibrium formalism of Legendre transforms U or V of the OIS and
Libor cost functions, represented by the integrals over x in the right-hand side of (1)-(2);
see (Karatzas and Shreve 1998) regarding the standard economic equilibrium formalism of
utility functions and Legendre transforms. These utility functions are linear to reflect the
general risk-neutral behavior of banks when lending, in which gains and losses are assessed
in terms of actuarial expectations. In other word, the choice of banks to lend is less driven
by preferences than by an optimization of the cost-of-capital and credit protection. One
could incorporate a concavely distorted utility function to account for risk aversion. Such a
distortion would appear in our model as an increased volatility of capital needs and of the
corresponding borrowing rate. However, we believe that short term lending decisions are
more driven by the estimated cost-of-capital than by a trade-off between interest returns
and default risk.
As we are dealing with short term debt with T ≤ 1 yr, we did not introduce a discount
factor. Discount factors would make no significant difference at this time horizon and would
only obscure the analysis in the financial qualitative perspective of this paper. Extending
the model to longer term debt might require a correction in this regard. We stick to the
stylized formulation (1)-(2) for tractability issues, and also in order to emphasize that the
volatility terms which appear in the end-formula (11) are convexity adjustments reflecting
an inherent optionality of LOIS, even without any risk premia.
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5Letting U(r) = maxn U(r;n) and V (L) = maxN V(L;N) represent the best utilities
a bank can achieve by lending OIS or Libor, respectively, our approach for explaining the
LOIS consists, given the O/N process r, in solving the following equation for L:
V (L) = U(r) (3)
This equation expresses an equilibrium relation between the utility of lending rolling overnight
versus Libor for a bank involved in both markets (indifference value at the optimal amounts
prescribed by the solution to the corresponding optimization problems). A second optimiza-
tion problem, left aside in this article, would be in the O/N process r, depending on the
supply/demand of liquidities and on base rates from the central bank.
To summarize at this point, the key features differentiating the two strategies are: on
the one hand, the deterioration in credit worthiness of a representative Libor “borrower”;
on the other hand, the funding liquidity of a representative Libor “lender”. Note that
other issues like central banks’ policies or possible manipulations of the rates are not ex-
plicitly stated in the analysis. However, to some extent, these can be reflected in the model
parametrization that we will specify now (see, in particular, the last paragraph of Subs. 2.1
and the discussion of Fig. 2). Also note that in our equilibrium analysis we only consider
a rolling overnight loan and a Libor loan of a given maturity (tenor) T , equating in (3)
the expected profits from optimally lending in each case, in order to eventually derive our
LOIS formula (11). It appears that this formula does show a (square root) dependence in
the tenor T . This relation doesn’t need to consider the possibility of lending at Libor over
different tenors T , but only rolled overnight versus at one fixed Libor of given maturity T .
2.1 Credit and Funding Costs Specification
For tractability we assume henceforth that the funding rate ρ is linear in D, i.e.
ρt(Dt + x) = αt + βtx (4)
where αt = ρt(Dt) is the time-t cost-of-capital of the lending bank and the coefficient βt
(positive in spirit) represents the marginal cost of borrowing one more unit of notional for
the bank already indebted at the level Dt. For instance, αt = 2% and βt = 50bp means
that the last euro borrowed by the bank was at an annualized interest charge of 2 cents,
whereas if the bank would be indebted by e100 more, the next euro to be borrowed by the
bank would be at an annualized interest charge of 2.5 cents.
By (4), we have
U(r;n) = 1
T
E
∫ T
0
(
(rt − αt)nt − 1
2
βtnt
2
)
dt (5)
Denoting by λt the intensity of τ and letting γt = αt + λt and `t = e
− ∫ t0 λsds, we also have:
V(L;N) = 1
T
E
∫ T
0
(
(L− γt)N − 1
2
βtN
2
)
`tdt (6)
where a standard credit risk computation was used to get rid of the default indicator
functions in (6) (see for instance (Bielecki and Rutkowski 2002)). As explained after (2),
the stylized default time τ reflects the deterioration of the average credit quality of a Libor
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6representative borrower during the length of the tenor. Recall the classical argumentation
of (Merton 1974), according to which a high-quality credit-name has a decreasing CDS
curve reflecting the expected deterioration of his credit. Consistent with this interpretation,
the intensity λt of τ can thus be proxyed by the slope of the credit curve of the Libor
representative (and therefore high-quality) borrower (differential between the borrower’s 1y
CDS spread and the spread of her short term certificate deposits, currently 10 to a few tens
of bp for major banks). Accordingly we call λt the credit skew of a Libor representative
borrower.
Note that central banks’ liquidity policies can be reflected in the αt and βt components
of the cost-of-liquidity ρ in (4). A possible manipulation effect, or incentive for a Libor
contributor to bias its borrowing rate estimate in order to appear in a better condition than
it is in reality (Wheatley 2012), can be included as a spread in the borrower’s credit risk
skew component λ.
3 LOIS Formula
Problems (1), (5) and (2), (6) are respectively solved, for given r and L, as follows. Writing
ct := αt− rt, the OIS problem (1), (5) is resolved independently at each date t according to
ut(rt;nt) = ctnt − 1
2
βtn
2
t ←− max nt
hence
n∗t =
ct
βt
and ut(rt;n
∗
t ) =
c2t
2βt
The expected profit of the bank over the period [0, T ] is
U(r) = U(r;n∗) = E
(
1
T
∫ T
0
c2t
2βt
dt
)
In the Libor problem (2), (6), we must solve
TV(L;N) = NE
∫ T
0
(L− γt)`tdt− 1
2
N2E
∫ T
0
βt`tdt ←− max N
hence
N∗ =
E 1T
∫ T
0 (L− γt)`tdt
E 1T
∫ T
0 βt`tdt
and V (L) = V(L;N∗) =
(
E 1T
∫ T
0 (L− γt)`tdt
)2
2E 1T
∫ T
0 βt`tdt
(7)
We define R = E 1T
∫ T
0 rtdt. The sequel of the paper is devoted to the computation of
a stylized LOIS defined as (L∗ − R), where L∗ is, given the process r, the solution to (3)
(assumed to exist; note that the function V is continuous and increasing in L, so that a
solution L∗ to (3) can only be uniquely defined).
First note that in case λ = 0, one necessarily has U(r) ≥ V (R), since the constant
N∗ solving the Libor maximization problem (2) is a particular strategy (constant process
nt = N
∗) of the OIS maximization problem (1). As V is an increasing function, the
indifference pricing equation (3) in turn yields that L∗ ≥ R.
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7Let V0(·;N) be the utility of lending Libor in case λ = 0. When λ > 0, for each given
amount N , one has via λ which is present in γ in (6) that V(R;N) ≤ V0(R;N) (up to the
second order impact of the discount factor `). Hence V (R) ≤ V0(R) ≤ U(r) follows, the
latter inequality resulting from the inequality already proven in case λ = 0 joint to the fact
that τ doesn’t appear in U(r;n). We conclude as in case λ = 0 that L∗ ≥ R.
For notational convenience let us introduce the time-space probability measures P
product of P times dtT over Ω × [0, T ], along with P̂ such that dP̂dP ∝ `. For a process
f = ft(ω) we denote the corresponding time-space averages by
f¯ = Ef = E
1
T
∫ T
0
ftdt , f̂ = Êf = E
[
f
`
`
]
(so, in this notation, R = r¯). Let similarly for every processes f, g
Cov(f, g) = E(fg)− EfEg , σ̂2f = Ê(f − f̂)2. (8)
Since
U(r) = E
[
c2
2β
]
and V (L) =
`
2
(L− γ̂)2
2E[β`]
equating V (L∗) = U(r) yields
`
2
(L∗ − γ̂)2 = E[β`]E
[
c2
β
]
(9)
in which
E[β`]E
[
c2
β
]
= E
[
c2`
]− Cov [β`, c2
β
]
So
`
2
(L∗ − γ̂)2 = `Ê [c2]− Cov [β`, c2
β
]
A particularly interesting point is “at-the-money” when R = α̂ = γ̂ − λ̂, i.e. (recall R ≡ r¯)
ĉ = α̂− r̂ = r¯ − r̂. Then the previous formula reads :
`(L∗ −R− λ̂)2 = σ̂2c + `−1(r¯ − r̂)2 − Cov
[
β
`
`
,
c2
β
]
(10)
A reasonable guess is that `
−1
(r¯−r̂)2 and the covariance are negligible in the right-hand-side
(in particular these terms vanish when the credit risk deterioration intensity λ is zero and
the marginal cost-of-capital coefficient β is constant). More precisely, for the sake of the
argument, let us postulate a diffusive behavior of the instantaneous funding spread process
ct = αt − rt, i.e. dct = σ∗dWt for some “reference volatility” σ∗ and a Brownian motion
W. Let us also assume a constant λt = λ
∗ (“reference credit skew” of the borrower) and
a constant marginal cost of borrowing β. Neglecting the impact of the “discount factor”
`t = e
−λ∗t ≈ 1− λ∗t in (10) (so that P̂ ≈ P), it follows that
σ̂2c ≈ σ¯2c = (σ∗)2E
1
T
∫ T
0
W 2t dt = (σ
∗)2T/2
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8and our “LOIS formula” follows from the above as2:
L∗ −R ≈ λ∗ + σ∗
√
T/2 (11)
From a broader perspective, according to formula (10), the two key drivers of the LOIS are:
• a suitable average λ∗ of the borrower’s credit skew λ, which can be seen as the “intrinsic
value” component of the LOIS and is a borrower’s credit component;
• a suitable volatility σ∗ of the instantaneous funding spread process ct; this second
component can be seen as the “time-value” of the LOIS and interpreted as a lender’s
liquidity component.
From a quantitative trading perspective, the formula (11) can be used for implying
the value σ∗ “priced” by the market from an observed LOIS L∗−R, and a borrower’s CDS
slope taken as a proxy for λ∗. The value σ∗ thus implied through (11) can be compared by
a bank to an internal estimate of its “realized” funding spread volatility, so that the bank
can decide whether it should rather lend Libor or OIS, much like with going long or short
an equity option depending on the relative position of the implied and realized volatilities of
the underlying stock. Another possible application of the formula (11) is for the calibration
of the volatility σ∗ of the funding spread process ct in a stochastic model for the latter, e.g.
in the context of multiple-curve CVA computations.
3.1 Numerical Illustration
Fig. 2 shows the EUR market 15/08/2007 to 16/04/2012 time series of the intercept, slope
and R2 coefficients of the linear regression of the LOIS term structure against
√
T/3m
or
√
T/6m, for T varying from 1m to 1yr (of course choosing
√
T/3m or
√
T/6m as a
regressor only affects the slope coefficient of the regression, by a factor of
√
2). In our
financial interpretation, the intercept represents the credit component of the LOIS (of any
tenor T ), while the slope coefficients represents the liquidity component of the LOIS for
the Libor with tenor T = 3m or 6m (we recall that 3m is the most liquid tenor on the
Libor markets and 6m is the second most liquid one). So the red and blue (resp. red and
purple) curves on the figure can be viewed as the credit and liquidity components of the
3m (resp. 6m) Libor. Before Aug 2007 the LOIS is negligible so that the regression (not
displayed on the figure) is insignificant. Since the“advent” of the LOIS in mid-Aug 2007,
we can distinguish three market regimes. In a first phase, until Q1 of 2009, the market
seems to “try to understand” what happens, with an R2 becoming significant together with
very large and volatile credit (“red intercept”) and liquidity (“blue or purple slope”) LOIS
components. Note in particular the spike of both components at the turn of the credit
crisis following Lehman’s default in Sept 2008, during which the interbank drop of trust
created both a credit and a liquidity crisis. Between Q2 of 2009 and mid-2011, the situation
seems “stabilized” with an R2 close to 1, a liquidity LOIS component of the order of 30bps
on the 3m or 45bps on the 6m and a much smaller credit LOIS component. The ongoing
Eurozone crisis, prompted by the US downgrade mid-2011, reveals a third pattern with a
much higher liquidity LOIS component, of the order of 60bps on the 3m or 90bps on the 6m,
revealing increased funding liquidity concern of banks, due to harder regulatory constraints
2Admitting that L∗ − R − λ̂ ≥ 0, a natural assumption as Libor lending should at least compensate for
the credit risk over the tenor horizon period, cf. the comments following the equation (7).
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9(e.g. government bonds no longer repositable). To illustrate the three “market regimes” in
this analysis, Fig. 3 shows the fit between a theoretical square root term structure and the
empirical LOIS term structure corresponding to the Euribor/Eonia-swap data of 14 Aug
2008, 28 Apr 2010 and 16 Apr 2012 (data of the right panel in Fig. 1). The last two terms
that we neglected in (10) to deduce (11) are a possible explanation for (minor) departures
of the actual LOIS spread curve from the theoretical square root term structure implied by
(11).
In relation with the discussion of the economical determinants of λt and αt in Subs.
2.1, note that intercepts of e.g. 10 bp appear as reasonable for a “credit skew”, that is, the
differential between the one year CDS spread and the short term certificate deposit credit
spread of a major bank, while the coefficient of
√
T/2, ranging between 100 and 200 bp/yr
(corresponding to magnifying on Fig. 2 by a factor 2 the purple curve, or slope coefficients
of the regression against
√
T/6m, ), is quite in line with recent orders of magnitude of the
volatility of major banks’ one year CDS spreads.
Figure 2: Time series of the “red” intercepts (in %; credit component of the LOIS), “blue”
and “purple” slopes (in %; liquidity component of the 3m- and 6m- LOIS) and “green” R2
coefficients of the regressions of the 1m to 1yr LOIS against
√
T/3m or
√
T/6m, over the
period from 15/08/2007 to 16/04/2012.
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Figure 3: Euribor / EONIA-swap rates (left) and square root fit of the LOIS (right), T = 1m
to 12m. Top to bottom: 14 Aug 2008, 28 Apr 2010 and 16 Apr 2012 (data of the right
panel in Fig. 1).
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Conclusion
Since the 2007 subprime crisis, OIS and Libor markets (Eonia and Euribor in the EUR
market) diverged suddenly. We show that, by optimizing their lending between Libor and
OIS markets, banks are led to apply a spread (LOIS) over the OIS rate when lending at
Libor. Theory implies that the LOIS has two components: one corresponding to the credit
skew λt of a representative Libor borrower in an interbank loan, and one corresponding to
the liquidity funding spread ct = αt − rt of a representative Libor lender, where αt and
rt respectively denote the instantaneous refinancing rate of the lender and the overnight
interbank rate. Assuming a diffusive evolution of the instantaneous funding spread ct, the
above-mentioned optimization results in a square root term structure of the LOIS given by
the formula (11), where the intercept λ∗ can be proxied by the slope of a representative LI-
BOR credit curve and the coefficient σ∗ is a volatility of ct. These theoretical developments
are corroborated by empirical evidence on the EUR market studied in this paper on the
period half-2007 half-2012, with LOIS explained in a balanced way by credit and liquidity
until the beginning of 2009 and dominantly explained by liquidity since then. The method-
ology of this paper is relevant for any market in which credit and funding liquidity are the
main drivers of interbank risk. Residual discrepancies between the theory and the data can
be explained by the existence of other features such as Libor manipulations3. With respect
to a multiple-curve pricing approach where market OIS and Libor curves are simply fitted,
the equilibrium approach of this paper allows a bank to, in principle, arbitrage the LOIS,
by preferably lending Libor (resp. OIS) whenever its internally estimated funding spread is
statistically found less (resp. more) volatile than σ∗ implied from the market through the
LOIS formula (11). Another application of this formula is for the calibration or estimation
of the volatility σ∗ of the funding spread process ct in a stochastic model for the latter.
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